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I.R.C. SECTION 999: TAXING THE ARAB BOYCOTT
In 1951 the Arab League' instituted a formal' trade boycott against
Israel and its supporters.' The Arab boycott attracted little attention
until the recent oil price increases made many Arab nations major world
economic powers. As Middle Eastern trade opportunities increased,
Arab nations successfully pressured United States firms to comply with
boycott restrictions in order to compete in this lucrative market., De-
spite congressional recognition that the Arab boycott is contrary to basic
principles of competition and fundamental notions of freedom,' early
legislative efforts to control United States involvement proved ineffec-
tive.' The Tax Reform Act of 1976,1 however, contains a potentially
1. The League of Arab States is an informal association comprised of the following
twenty Middle Eastern countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Leba-
non, Libya, Mauritania, Morrocco, Oman, Peoples' Democratic Republican of Yemen,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yeman
Arab Republic. See generally R. MACDONALD, THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES (1965).
2. The formation of a Central Boycott Office, with headquarters in Damascus, marked
the beginning of the formal trade boycott. L. PRESTON, TRADE PATTERNS IN THE MIDDLE
EAST 51 (1970).
3. Because foreign trade is a matter of national sovereignty, a trade boycott is not a
violation of international law. Hyde & Wehele, The Boycott in Foreign Affairs, 27 AM. J.
INT'L L. 1, 2 (1933). Many nations, including the United States, have used trade boycotts
to achieve various economic, diplomatic, and foreign policy objectives. See Muir, The
Boycott in International Law, 9 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 187, 187-95 (1974).
The Arab boycott of Israel takes many forms. The primary boycott is the refusal of Arab
countries to trade with Israel. The secondary boycott is a refusal to deal with those who
trade with or support Israel. The third form, sometimes termed an "extended secondary,"
"peripheral," or "tertiary" boycott, is the Arabs' refusal to deal with those doing business
with supporters of Israel. See SuBcoMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE
COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., THE ARAB BocOr
AND AMERIcAN BustNESs 1 (Subcomm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as BoycoTr REPORT];
Baker, Antitrust Remedies Against Government-Inspired Boycotts, Shortages, and
Squeezes: Wandering on the Road to Mecca, 61 CoPNELL L. REv. 911, 938 (1976). The Arab
boycott is coordinated by the Central Boycott Office which maintains a blacklist of firms
and individuals with known "Zionist affiliation."
4. Guzzardi, That Curious Barrier on the Arab Frontiers, FORTUNE, July 1975, at 82,
172.
5. Export Administration Act of 1969, § 3, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(5) (1970); 122 CONG.
REc. H10,834 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1976).
6. Before 1977, provisions of the Export Administration Act of 1969 (EAA), 50 U.S.C.
app. §§ 2401-2413 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974), and regulations promulgated thereunder, 15
C.F.R. § 369 (1976); 41 Fed. Reg. 46,443 (1976) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369.4), were
the only direct federal legislative and administrative responses to the boycott problem.
The EAA contains two potentially effective antiboycott elements: first, a statement of
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effective weapon against unchecked compliance with Arab boycott de-
mands.
This Note focuses on the antiboycott provisions of the Tax Reform Act
of 1976 as codified in section 9998 of the Internal Revenue Code. The
value of the tax sanctions of section 999 as a deterrent to boycott partici-
pation and as an incentive to comply with the section's reporting re-
quirements will be examined. The Note then explores the potential
impact of these reporting requirements in light of domestic antitrust
and civil rights legislation, and concludes with a discussion of the fifth
amendment self-incrimination problems inherent in the reporting re-
quirements.
I
SECTION 999
A. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
A central feature of section 999 is its two-part reporting requirement?
The first requires any person" conducting operations" in, or related to,
congressional policy which opposes restrictive trade practices and encourages noncompli-
ance with boycott requests in any form, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(5) (1970); and second, a
requirement that all domestic concerns report boycott-related requests to the Secretary
of Commerce for action appropriate to implement that legislative policy, 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 2403(b)(1) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974). The potential of these provisions has not been
realized. The Department of Commerce, opposed to the EAA from the outset, has main-
tained a practice of lax enforcement, niggardly statutory construction, and inept adminis-
tration. Boycorr REPORT, supra note 3, at 4-7, 14-17, 23-29, 80-84; Note, Export Policy,
Antitrust and the Arab Boycott, 51 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 94, 96-106 (1976). Although Congress
allowed the EAA to expire on Sept. 30, 1976, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2413 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974),
President Ford, acting under dubious authority, extended the Act by Exec. Order No.
11,940, 41 Fed. Reg. 43,707 (1976). Later he ordered the Secretary of Commerce to make
public all EAA boycott request reports. 41 Fed. Reg. 44,842 (1976). For a discussion of the
potential impact of these reports on the boycott, see note 120 infra.
7. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified in scattered sections of I.R.C.).
8. I.R.C. § 999, originally enacted as the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455,
§ 1064(a), 90 Stat. 1650.
9. I.R.C. § 999(a)(1)-(2).
10. For the purposes of § 999, the term "person" includes any United States citizen or
resident, and any domestic partnership, corporation, estate or trust. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3).
The term also includes any individual, trust, estate, partnership, association, company
or corporation owning stock in a Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC) or
claiming a foreign tax credit under I.R.C. § 901. The latter category reaches nonresident
alien individuals and foreign corporations engaged in trade within the United States.
I.R.C. §§ 906, 864(b); Department of the Treasury Tax Reform Act of 1976 Guidelines,
41 Fed. Reg. 49,923 (para. A-i) (1976) [hereinafter cited as Guidelines I]; Department
of the Treasury Tax Reform Act of 1976 Guidelines, 42 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (para. A-i)
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Guidelines I].
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boycotting countries,'2 or with the governments, companies, or nationals
of boycotting countries,'3 to file a return" indicating all such operations.
Certain other persons who have not conducted such operations must
report the activities of those with whom they are affiliated through
11. The term "operation" encompasses all forms of business or commercial
activities whether or not productive of income, including but not limited to, sales;
purchases; banking, financing and similar activities; extracting; processing; man-
ufacturing; production; construction; transportation; activities ancillary to the
foregoing (e.g., contract negotiating, advertising, site selecting, etc.); and the
performance of services, whether or not ancillary to the foregoing.
Guidelines I, supra note 10, at 49,925 (para. B-i). The term "operation" does not include
performance of personal services as an employee or eligibility for social security arising
therefrom. Guidelines HI, supra note 10, at 1094 (paras. B-2, B-3).
12. The Secretary of the Treasury maintains a list, updated quarterly, of boycotting
countries. The initial list may be found at 41 Fed. Reg. 48,384 (1976). Countries not on
the Secretary's list will be considered boycotting countries if and only if: (1) a person
knows or has reason to know that the country requires boycott participation within the
meaning of I.R.C. § 999(b)(3)-(4), discussed in notes 24-50 infra and accompanying text;
and (2) the person actually conducted operations in that country during the year. Opera-
tions merely related to that country are insufficient. I.R.C. § 999(a)(1)(B). Guidelines II,
supra note 10, at 1093 (para. A-i). For the classification of operations see note 13, infra.
Circumstances satisfying the "reason to know" requirement include receipt of an official
boycott request or knowledge that others have received similar requests. Guidelines I,
supra note 10, at 49,925 (para. C-i).
13. An operation is in, or related to, a boycotting country, or with the government, a
company or national of a boycotting country if it:
1. Is carried on in whole or part in a boycotting country ("in a country");
2. Is carried on outside a boycotting country either for or with the government,
a company, or a national of a boycotting country ("with the government, a
company, or a national of a country"); or
3. Is carried on outside a boycotting country for the government, a company,
or a national of a non-boycotting country if the person having the operation knows
or has reason to know that a specific good or service produced by the operation is
intended for use in a boycotting country or for the government, a company, or a
national of a boycotting country ("related to a country").
Guidelines I, supra note 10, at 49,925 (para. B-1). The definition of "operations related to
a country" compels a person funnelling his Arab League trade through independent for-
eign brokers to file operations reports. Although this definition by its terms includes trade
between any number of United States persons if the product or service involved is ulti-
mately and knowingly destined for a boycotting country, the reporting requirement is
waived in such circumstances. Guidelines I, supra note 10, at 49,924 (para. A-11). Purely
"incidental" contacts with Arab nationals in the normal course of business are also ex-
cepted. See Guidelines H, supra note 10, at 1094 (para. A-18).
The terms "in," "with," and "related to" do not appear uniformly throughout § 999,
leading to unintended and inconsistent results. See notes 38, 54 & 59 infra. To take
advantage of these inconsistencies, the taxpayer should divide his operations into three
classes, noting, however, that an operation may fit more than one class.
14. IRS Form 5713, originally announced in Guidelines I, supra note 10, at 49,924 (para.
A-5).
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business form or stock ownership."5 This provision will facilitate audits
because multiple returns describing the same operations must be filed.
Data compiled from the operations returns will indicate the quantum
of United States economic involvement in boycotting countries.
Second, a taxpayer16 must report whether, in any of these operations,
he participated in or cooperated with an international boycott" during
the year or was requested to do so." The taxpayer must also report the
precise nature of any boycott participation or requests therefor." Again,
taxpayers who have not participated in an international boycott must
report the participation of, and requests made to, certain affiliates. 0
15. A United States 10 percent shareholder of a foreign corporation as defined in I.R.C.
§ 951(b) must declare the foreign corporation's reportable operations. Guidelines I, supra
note 10, at 49,923-24 (paras. A-i, A-2). One issue arising in this context is the extent of a
shareholder's duty to gather the necessary information from a corporation over which he
has no control. See Guidelines H1, supra note 10, at 1094 (paras. A-16, A-18) (information
reasonably available).
All corporate members of controlled groups falling under the definition of "persons,"
see note 10 supra, must disclose all the reportable operations of any member. I.R.C. §
999(a)(1)(B)-(a)(2); Guidelines I, supra note 10, at 49,923 (para. A-i); Guidelines II, supra
note 10, at 1093 (para. A-i). But see Guidelines II, supra note 10, at 1093 (para. A-14)
(United States subsidiaries of foreign parent corporations not required to report parents'
operations in certain circumstances). Controlled groups are groups of corporations con-
nected through a certain percentage (generally 50 percent) of stock ownership. I.R.C. 44
993(a)(3), 1563(a). A common parent corporation may, however, file a consolidated return.
Guidelines I, supra note 10, at 49,924 (para. A-3).
The 10 percent shareholder rule coupled with the controlled group rule requires all
members of a controlled group to include in their returns all operations of foreign corpora-
tions of which any United States member is a 10 percent shareholder. Guidelines II, supra
note 10, at 1093 (para. A-13). This requirement is by no means obvious from the confusing
language of I.R.C. § 999(a)(1)(B)-(a)(2).
Each partner must report the operations of the entire partnership unless, in the case of
a partnership that has not participated in an international boycott during the year (see
notes 23-49 infra and accompanying text), the partnership files the return. Guidelines H,
supra note 10, at 1093-94 (paras. A-i, A-17).
16. "Taxpayer" is a less inclusive term than "person." I.R.C. § 7701(a)(14). Nonethe-
less, the Guidelines ascribe no importance to this difference; generally, the same group
required to file operations reports under I.R.C. § 999(a)(1) must file participation reports
under I.R.C. § 999(a)(2). The statutory meaning of "person" is discussed at note 10 supra.
17. "Participation in or cooperation with an international boycott" is § 999's central
term; for its analysis, see notes 23-49 infra and accompanying text. Presumptive participa-
tion or cooperation arises in certain circumstances and must be reported. See notes 20,
54 & 55 infra and accompanying text.
18. Unanswered, unsolicited requests that occur outside a course of bargaining or nego-
tiation need not be reported. Guidelines II, supra note 10, at 1093 (para. A-15).
19. I.R.C. § 999(a)(2). Presumably, the description of the boycott participation must
at least indicate under which subsection of IRC § 999(b)(3)-(4) it falls.
20. For a dicussion of these affiliates, see note 15 supra. Also, where a "person" controls
a corporation, boycott participation by that person is irrebuttably presumed to be partici-
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Because the taxpayer classifies all business as boycott or non-boycott
operations, reports filed under section 999 will give a clear and compre-
hensive picture of American involvement in the Arab boycott. Each
year the Secretary of the Treasury will transmit to Congress a summary
of all section 999 returns.2 ' The summaries will enable Congress to make
informed legislative judgments on the Arab boycott issue."
B. BoYcoTr PARTICIPATION OR COOPERATION
A person engages in boycott operations within the purview of section
999 if he "participates in or cooperates with" an international boycott.23
pation by the corporation, and vice versa. I.R.C. § 999(e). Control consists of 50 percent
stock ownership. I.R.C. § 304(c). The Guidelines also apply the subsection (e) presump-
tion to the operations report requirements of I.R.C. § 999(a)(1) without any statutory
authority where the controlling shareholder is an individual. See Guidelines I, supra note
10, at 1093 (para. A-i). I.R.C. § 999(a)(1) speaks of controlled groups, but individuals
cannot be members of controlled groups within the purview of I.R.C. § 993(a)(3).
21. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1067, 90 Stat. 1654.
22. The Treasury's reports to Congress will help "assess the effectiveness of this legisla-
tion in discouraging participation in or cooperation with international boycotts." H.R.
REP. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 470 (1976). The Treasury will notify the House Ways
and Means and Senate Finance Committees of the number of reports indicating opera-
tions in boycotting countries and the number of reports admitting compliance with boy-
cott requests. Other information on revenue, audits, and administration will be included,
but the identity of any person filing will not be disclosed to Congress. Id.
23. The term "participation in or cooperation with" an international boycott is key to
§ 999.
[A] person participates in or cooperates with an international boycott if he agrees
(A) as a condition of doing business directly or indirectly within a country or
with the government, a company, or a national of a country-
(i) to refrain from doing business with or in a country which is the
object of the boycott or with the government, companies, or nationals of
that country;
(ii) to refrain from doing business with any United States person
engaged in trade in a country which is the object of the boycott or with
the government, companies, or nationals of that country;
(iii) to refrain from doing business with any company whose owner-
ship or management is made up, all or in part, of individuals of a particu-
lar nationality, race, or religion, or to remove (or refrain from selecting)
corporate directors who are individuals of a particular nationality, race,
or religion; or
(iv) to refrain from employing individuals of a particular nationality,
race, or religion; or
(B) as a condition of the sale of a product to the government, a company, or
a national of a country, to refrain from shipping or insuring that product on a
carrier owned, leased, or operated by a person who does not participate in or
cooperate with an international boycott (within the meaning of subparagraph
(A)).
[Vol. 10:280
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The essential elements of participation or cooperation are an agreement,
as a condition of doing business, 24 to engage in any of the proscribed
activities. Participation or cooperation will only occur when all three
elements are present simultaneously.2
1. Agreements as a Condition of Doing Business
A section 999 agreement may be oral, written, tacit, or inferred from
a course of dealing2 and is not negated by a breach. 7 Nevertheless, a
section 999 agreement will not be inferred "from the mere fact that any
country is [unilaterally] exercising its sovereign rights." Certain ex-
I.R.C. § 999(b)(3). The Guidelines extensively elaborate this definition. See Guidelines I,
supra note 10, at 49,927-33 (paras. H to M).
24. This element entails the doing of business directly or indirectly within a country or
with the government, a company, or a national of a boycotting country. I.R.C. § 999(b)(3).
25. Guidelines I, supra note 10, at 49,930 (paras. H-27, H-28). For literary convenience,
the concept of "participation in or cooperation with an international boycott" will be
referred to as "participation."
Note that some operations otherwise participatory are exempted by § 1064(a) of the Tax
Reform Act of 1976. See Guidelines I, supra note 10, at 49,926-27 (paras. E-1 to E-8);
Guidelines H, supra note 10, at 1094-95 (paras. E-9 to E-11).
26. Guidelines I, supra note 10, at 49,923, 49,927-30 (paras. H-i, H-2, H-7, H-14, H-
26); see H.R. REP. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 467-68 (1976). For example, if a construc-
tion, services or import contract merely states that the laws or regulations of a boycotting
country will apply to the performance of that contract, there is no agreement until there
is a subsequent undertaking or agreement to comply with those laws. Guidelines I, supra
note 10, at 49,928 (paras. H-3, H-4, H-7). Also, the absence of boycott clauses in the
contract militates against the existence of an agreement. Id. at 49,928, 49,930 (pares. H-
5, H-23). Contra, id. at 49,928 (para. H-9) (domestic employment discrimination relating
to a reportable operation indicates an agreement).
An American firm that gives an Arab owner a right of prior approval as to any of the
firm's subcontractors is not considered to have made an agreement. However, a tacit
agreement will be found where the United States firm selects subcontractors solely from
a list of non-blacklisted companies. Id. at 49,929 (paras. H-13, H-15). The distinction
between the two situations lies in their form. The first case usually involves permissible
unilateral action by the Arab owner. See note 28 infra and accompanying text. The latter
case involves bilateral consent to a pattern of exclusion.
27. Guidelines I, supra note 10, at 49,929 (paras. H-18, H-19). Of course, an unaccepted
offer that includes boycott provisions does not constitute an agreement. Id. at 49,930
(para. H-24).
28. H.R. REP. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 467 (1976).
Thus, a taxpayer is not considered to have agreed to participate in or cooperate
with an international boycott merely by reason of the inability of the taxpayer to
obtain an export or import license from a sovereign country for specific goods.
Similarly, a taxpayer's inability, under the laws or administrative practices of a
country, to bring certain personnel into that country, to bring certain ships into
the waters of that country, to provide certain services in that country, or to import
or export certain products to or from a country, is not to be considered to consti-
tute an agreement to participate in or cooperate with an international boycott.
1977]
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plicit agreements to comply with a country's import or export laws are
also specifically exempted from the operation of the statute." By limit-
ing the definition of "agreement" in this fashion, section 999 respects
the sovereign right of a country to conduct a trade boycott from within
its borders, and addresses itself entirely to the secondary aspects of the
Arab boycott."0 Of course, any agreement must be made as a condition
of doing business before the statute applies. This element provides the
necessary nexus between the agreement and the trade boycott.
2. Proscribed Activities
A person participates in or cooperates with an international boycott
if he agrees to refrain from doing business in a boycotted country, or
with its government, nationals, or companies."' No other federal law
directly addresses this particular aspect of the Arab secondary boycott;"
however, four states currently have antiboycott legislation in force, and
New York's could apply here.3
An agreement to refrain from doing business with certain United
States persons also constitutes participation34 where at least one of those
persons 5 is "engaged in trade" in a boycotted country "or with the
Id. See also Guidelines I, supra note 10, at 49,930-31 (paras. I-1, 1-2, 1-5).
29. I.R.C. § 999(b)(4)(B)-(C). A person must still file operations reports with respect
to exempted agreements, although the Department of the Treasury waived the operations
reports requirement for an agreement sanctioned by United States law under I.R.C. §
999(b)(4)(A). Guidelines I, supra note 10, at 49,924 (paras. A-9, A-10).
30. For a definition of secondary and extended secondary boycott practices, see note 3
supra.
31. I.R.C. § 999(b)(3)(A)(i).
32. But see, Note, The Antitrust Implications of the Arab Boycott, 74 MIcH. L. REv.
795, 802-05 (1976) (regulations promulgated under EAA could be construed as applicable).
33. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.5 (West Supp. 1977); Illinois Blacklist Trade Law, Pub. Act
No. 79-964, 1975 Ill. Legis. Serv. 1627 (West), ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 29 §§ 91-96 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1977); MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 11-2A01 to 2A15 (Supp. 1976); N.Y. Exec. Law
§§ 296.13, 298-a (McKinney Supp. 1976). The New York statute outlaws any boycott
agreement, including concerted refusals to deal with Israelis; it reaches "acts" of all New
York residents whether peformed within or without the state. The California and Mary-
land statutes only reach agreements affecting residents. Illinois' law merely renders boy-
cott agreements void as a matter of public policy.
34. I.R.C. § 999(b)(3)(A)(ii). However, it is easy to avoid this type of participation by
structuring the transaction to take advantage of the sovereign rights exception. See notes
28 & 29 supra and accompanying text. For example, in lieu of making an agreement to
boycott blacklisted firms, an American contractor might agree with an Arab country to
have all goods and services supplied under the contract delivered F.O.B. the boycotting
country without having participated in the boycott. Under such a contract, blacklisted
firms or persons will not bid for subcontracts because Arab import laws prohibit entry of
their goods, services, and personnel. Guidelines I, supra note 10, at 49,931 (para. J-7).
35. A United States corporation's foreign subsidiary engaged in trade in a boycotted
country does not qualify. Guidelines I, supra note 10, at 49,931 (para. J-4).
[Vol. 10:280
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government, companies, or nationals of that country. '3 Much of this
type of boycott compliance, however, will go unreported since many
firms are blacklisted because of their support of Israel or their "Zionist
connections," but have no direct trade relations in Israel or with Isra-
elis.37 Another loophole allows a person to avoid participation or cooper-
ation by channelling his Arab League trade through a neutral foreign
broker or middleman.3 8
Participation also includes agreements "to refrain from doing busi-
ness with any company whose ownership or management is made up
. . .of individuals of a particular nationality, race, or religion."39 This
subsection could be interpreted to extend to any agreement to boycott
a firm, if that firm happened to employ certain individuals, but the
guidelines require that the agreement must be to refrain from doing
36. I.R.C. § 999(b)(3)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). The term "engaged in trade" is left
undefined in § 999. However, I.R.C. § 864(b)(1)(A), which speaks of being engaged in
trade or business within the United States, might be a guide. If so, such trade must be
substantial, regular, and continuous. Commissioner v. Spermacet Whaling & Shipping
Co., 281 F.2d 646, 650 (6th Cir. 1960); Lewellyn v. Pittsburgh B. & L.E.R.R. Co., 222 F.
177, 185 (3d Cir. 1915). Contra, Rev. Rul. 58-63, 1958-1 C.B. 624; Rev. Rul. 60-249, 1960-
2 C.B. 264 (single horse race entry is engaging in trade in United States). Generally,
whether a person engages in trade or business within the United States is a fact question
determined on a case-by-case basis. Treas. Reg. § 1.864-2(e), T.D. 6948, 1968-1 C.B. 327,
335-36. A taxpayer may be hard-pressed to decide whether he has participated in an
international boycott if he must ascertain where or with whom those persons that he
agreed to boycott are engaged in trade. The undefined extent of the taxpayer's duty to
gather such information complicates his problem. Fortunately extra penalties under
I.R.C. § 999(f) are only assessed for willful failures to report.
37. Guidelines I, supra note 10, at 49,931 (para. J-2).
38. Under such a scheme, the broker, who must be neither a "person" within the
meaning of § 999, see note 10 supra, nor a national of a boycotting country, makes the
agreements not to deal with blacklisted firms. The broker's American exporters make no
agreements to boycott anyone and thus do not participate in the international boycott
despite any reluctance to deal with any blacklisted firms for fear of being blacklisted
themselves and then cut off by the broker. Thus the imposition of the broker in the stream
of commerce serves to separate the "agreement" from the "proscribed activity" and pre-
vent boycott participation. See Guidelines I, supra note 10, at 49,929-30 (para. H-22).
Further, the absence of the term "related to" in I.R.C. § 999(b)(3)(A) indicates that
participation will not occur with respect to such operations, which include those con-
ducted by the foreign broker method. For a discussion of the classifications of operations,
see note 13 supra.
On the other hand, an agreement between an American exporter and his foreign broker
may be inferred from a course of dealing, see note 26 supra, and the term "indirectly" in
I.R.C. § 999(b)(3)(A) might be construed to include trading through a foreign broker.
Under such a construction, participation or cooperation could be found. Further, the form
of a transaction may be disregarded if it is a mere device for tax avoidance. Gregory v.
Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935).
39. I.R.C. § 999(b)(3)(A)(iii).
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business because a firm employs these individuals." In other words,
there must be a causative rather than a circumstantial relationship
between the agreement and the character of the firm's management.
Moreover, since the guidelines require a specific reference in the agree-
ment to a particular religion or nationality and because firms are often
blacklisted for reasons other than the makeup of their management, this
subsection does not apply to agreements to refuse to deal with black-
listed firms as such.4' Thus its utility is greatly restricted.2
Further, a person participates where he agrees "to remove (or refrain
from selecting) corporate directors" or "to refrain from employing indi-
viduals of a particular nationality, race, or religion."43 This form of
participation is rare" and is easily avoided by invoking the sovereign
rights exception."
Lastly, participation encompasses agreements not to ship or insure a
product on or with a carrier that does not participate in an international
boycott." The many statutory hurdles in this subsection prevent its
wide application," and evading its literal terms is quite simple."
40. Guidelines I, supra note 10, at 49,932 (para. K-3).
41. Id. (para. L-2). Of course, if any of the blacklisted firms are engaged in trade in a
boycotting country, participation occurs under subsection (b)(3)(A)(ii). See notes 34-38
supra and accompanying text.
42. The apparent intent of this subsection is to include firms blacklisted for religious
reasons. An amendment to that effect would increase the efficacy of § 999. The Secretary
could maintain and publish the blacklist as he does the list of boycotting countries under
§ 999(a)(3).
43. I.R.C. § 999(b)(3)(A)(iii)-(iv).
44. Approximately .05 percent of boycott request reports filed under the EAA, 50 U.S.C.
app. § 2403(b)(1) (1970), involved discrimination on religious grounds. Nolte, The Saudi
Connection & the Arab Boycott, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1977, at A-27, col. 2. The Depart-
ment of Commerce also forbids exporters and related service organizations from comply-
ing with such discriminatory requests. 15 C.F.R. § 369.2 (1976).
45. See notes 28 & 29 supra. Thus a person may not agree to exclude from consideration
for employment members of any religious sect, but he may condition all employment
contracts on the employee's ability to obtain visas for the boycotting country without
having participated in the boycott. The employer will not have made an agreement, even
though no members of the blacklisted sect apply for the jobs because they know they will
be unable to procure the necessary visas. Guidelines I, supra note 10, at 49,928-29 (paras.
H-9 to H-15).
46. I.R.C. § 999(b)(3)(B).
47. Under this subsection, the agreement must be as a condition of sale instead of a
condition of doing business. Thus the subsection only applies to sellers, not freight for-
warders, insurers, or carriers. Guidelines I, supra note 10, at 49,930, 49,933 (paras. H-27,
H-28, M-4). The agreement must contain shipping or insurance directions; voluntary
compliance with Arab import and shipping laws does not constitute an agreement. Id. at
49,930 (para. H-23).
48. The easiest way to avoid this subsection is for the seller to have another person make
the shipping and insurance arrangements. See Guidelines I, supra note 10, at 49,923
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In sum, the definition of participation in or cooperation with an inter-
national boycott has several major loopholes. Further, the rules ignore
many of the more common boycott clauses.49 However, the most invidi-
ous boycott compliance, including many outright refusals to deal and
agreements to discriminate, must be reported.
C. TAX BENEFIT DENIAL
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 also denies taxpayers"0 the benefits of the
foreign tax credit,5' the DISC rules,5 2 and foreign income deferral 53 at-
tributable to participation in or cooperation with an international boy-
cott. The statutory language of the tax benefit denial is simple, but the
computation thereof is not.
If the taxpayer participates in or cooperates with an international
boycott in just one instance, a rebuttable presumption arises that the
taxpayer has participated in the boycott with respect to all his opera-
tions in every boycotting country. 4 The taxpayer may rebut the pre-
(paras. M-2, M-3). The seller could also, in response to a request, certify that he is not
using a blacklisted carrier or insurance company (negative certification). Such a certifica-
tion is not an agreement. Id., (para. M-9). Negative certification is already the most
common way to satisfy shipping and insurance boycott requests. Boycorr REPORT, supra
note 3, at 33.
49. For a listing of these clauses, see BoYcoTT REPORT, supra note 3, at 32-33.
50. I.R.C. § 908, relating to denial of the foreign tax credit, refers to "persons" instead
of "taxpayers." This confusing interchange of terms is designed to make clear that where
a foreign corporation (a "person" but not necessarily a "taxpayer") participates in an
international boycott, a United States shareholder of that corporation (a "taxpayer") will
be denied some foreign tax credit.
51. I.R.C. §§ 908, 999(c)(2). The foreign tax credit, I.R.C. §§ 901-908, 960, generally
gives a United States taxpayer credit against his United States tax liability equal to the
amount of foreign income taxes paid. Special rules apply for controlled foreign corpora-
tions and other domestic shareholders of foreign corporations. See generally E. OwENs,
THE FOREIGN TAX CREDrr (1961).
52. I.R.C. §§ 995(b)(1)(F), 999(c)(2). DISC's, which are treated in I.R.C. §§ 991-997,
are exempt from federal income taxation. See Ward, A Tax Analysis of Domestic Interna-
tional Sales Corporations (DISC): The Case of the Slipped DISC?, 6 CAUF. W. INT'L L.J.
154 (1975); Gifford, U.S. Taxation of Export Operations: A Primer, 5 DEN. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 19, 28-32 (1975). Shareholders of the DISC are deemed to have received a dividend
equal to a part of the DISC's income. The deemed distribution is increased by the earnings
attributable to boycott participation.
53. I.R.C. §§ 952(a), 999(c)(2). A United States 10 percent shareholder of a controlled
foreign corporation (CFC) must include in his gross income a pro rata share of the CFC's
subpart F income, increased by the earnings attributable to boycott participation.
54. I.R.C. § 999(b)(1). See also H.R. REP. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 468 (1976).
The subsection (b) presumption is applied to members of a controlled group as though
they were a single taxpayer. For a discussion of controlled group reporting requirements,
see notes 15 & 20 supra. I.R.C. § 999(b)(1)-(2), by its express terms, raises the subsection
(b) presumption with respect to operations in a boycotting country or with the govern-
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sumption for each "clearly separate and identifiable""5 operation by
"clearly demonstrat[ing] that he . . . did not participate in or cooperate
with the international boycott in connection with that operation."5
Thus, the taxpayer loses his tax benefits with respect to all operations
in all boycotting countries except those for which the presumption has
been rebutted, irrespective of actual participation. This statutory pre-
sumption functions primarily as an adjunct to the reporting provisions
of section 999. A taxpayer can minimize his tax benefit loss by admitting
specific boycott operations and maintaining records sufficient to clearly
demonstrate the innocent character of the remaining operations."7 This
scheme effects a proportional trade-off between the revenue and infor-
mation collected by the IRS.5"
The taxpayer must elect one of two systems for calculating the
ments, companies, or nationals of such countries. Nevertheless, the presumption may be
rebutted with respect to operations in or related to a boycotting country, even though the
presumption does not apply to operations related to a boycotting country. The inconsis-
tent use of the three terms forced the Department of the Treasury to conclude that the
presumption applies only to operations conducted in boycotting countries. Guidelines I,
supra note 10, at 49,925 (para. D-1). For a discussion of the different classes of operations,
see note 12 supra. This inconsistency severely restricts the utility of the presumption and
should be remedied.
Where a person controls a corporation, that person's participation is presumptively
participation by the corporation and vice versa. I.R.C. § 999(e). See also note 20 supra.
The subsection (b) presumption coupled with the subsection (e) presumption may trap
the unwary taxpayer. For example, consider a taxpayer who has reportable operations but
completely avoids participation. If he controls a corporation that does engage in a boycott
the irrebutable subsection (e) presumption imputes that participation to the innocent
taxpayer. This imputed participation then triggers the subsection (b) presumption, forc-
ing the taxpayer to rebut it by clearly demonstrating the benign character of all of his
operations in boycotting countries or suffer tax benefit denial. The taxpayer may be
unprepared to rebut the presumption because he believed he had not participated in an
international boycott.
55. I.R.C. § 999(b)(2)(B). The burden of proof is on the taxpayer to establish separate
operations. Guidelines I, supra note 10, at 49,925 (para. D-2). The existence of a separate
and identifiable operation depends on "facts and circumstances" such as separate nego-
tiation and performance of contracts, different personnel on the job, and different prod-
ucts or services. Id. (para. D-3).
56. I.R.C. § 999(b)(2)(A).
57. [I]t is expected that the returns and the determinations by the taxpayer
will be audited and the accuracy of the taxpayer's determinations will be verified
. . [I]t is anticipated that the IRS will develop a group of experts who are
knowledgeable in audit aspects of determining whether a taxpayer is involved in
an international boycott.
H.R. REP. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 469 (1976).
58. Section 999 was not designed to be a revenue raising provision. It is expected to
bring in less than $100 million per year. S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess, 290 (1976).
This optimistic figure is less than one quarter of one percent of regular corporate income
tax collected each year. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, ANNUAL REPORT 94 (1974).
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amount of denied tax benefits. One system involves the application of
the International Boycott Factor (IBF)5 to the taxpayer's otherwise
available tax benefits. The other alternative allows the loss of only those
tax benefits "specifically attributable to the operations in which the
taxpayer participated in or cooperated with an international boycott.""
There are significant tax differences between the two systems, and
structuring transactions to take advantage of these differences may at-
tenuate the impact of section 999.11
59. I.R.C. § 999(c)(1). The IBF is a fraction. The numerator reflects sales, purchases,
and payroll attributable to all operations for which there is actual or unrebutted presump-
tive boycott participation. The denominator reflects all foreign activity. Treas. Reg. §
7.999-1(c), T.D. 7467, 42 Fed. Reg. 11,833 (1977)(temporary regulations)(proposed final
regulations found at 42 Fed. Reg. 11,845 (1977)). See also Guidelines I, supra note 10, at
49,927 (para. F-i); H.R. REP. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 468 (1976).
I.R.C. § 999(c)(1) provides that the IBF numerator include all operations in or related
to boycotting countries for which there is actual or unrebutted presumptive boycott partic-
ipation. For a discussion of the classes of operations and presumptions of participation,
see notes 13, 20 & 54 supra and accompanying text. Participation or cooperation, however,
does not normally arise with respect to operations related to a boycotting country. See note
38 supra. Nor does the rebuttable subsection (b) presumption of participation apply to
such operations. See note 54 supra. Due to these statutory inconsistencies, the IBF numer-
ator should in theory reflect the purchases, sales, and payroll only of operations in boycot-
ting countries. The temporary regulations purport to adopt this view. See Treas. Reg. §
7.999-1(b)(5)-(9). Nonetheless, to satisfy the obvious legislative intent to deny those tax
benefits attributable to boycott operations both in and related to boycotting countries, the
regulations devise an "ultimate destination rule" whereby a sale, purchase, or exchange
of property (including money) or services (and payroll incidental thereto) is deemed to
be located in the country of ultimate use, consumption, or disposition. Treas. Reg. § 7.999-
1(b)(5)-(8), (10). Thus operations related to boycotting countries (and some operations
with their nationals) are subsumed in the IBF definition of operations in those countries.
60. I.R.C. § 999(c) (2). Under this option, the taxpayer must demonstrate those portions
of income and paid taxes attributable to operations in which there was actual or presump-
tive participation or cooperation "by performing an in-depth analysis of the profit and loss
data of each separate and identifiable operation." Guidelines II, supra note 10, at 1095
(para. F-6). (Quaere whether under this method the taxpayer is absolved of his DISC
benefit loss by the incorrect reference to nonexistent I.R.C. § 995(b)(1)(D)(ii) instead of
subparagraph (F)(ii)).
61. The taxpayer must apply one method (IBF or "taxes specifically attributable") to
all his operations for that taxable year; however, no member of a controlled group is bound
by another member's election. Guidelines I, supra note 10, at 49,927 (paras. F-4, F-5).
Boycott operations determine the applicable IBF. Because "operations" are merely
activity without regard to profit or taxes, see note 11 supra, the IBF method may be
preferable where a taxpayer's boycott operations are taxed at a higher average rate, have
a higher rate of return, or have a lower overhead than his other world-wide operations.
See note 59 supra. The "specifically attributable" method is preferable where operations
can be structured to produce little tax benefit subject to disqualification and can be
particularly advantageous where the foreign tax credit is the most important tax benefit.
Under this method, the total amount of foreign taxes paid is reduced by the disqualified
amount before the overall limitation of I.R.C. §§ 904, 907 is applied. Guidelines II, supra
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The reporting and tax-sanction provisions of section 999 jointly satisfy
the primary purpose of the Act: congressional access to accurate data
detailing United States involvement in international trade boycotts,
and the imputing of a higher cost to participation through tax sanctions,
stiff penalties for noncompliance, 2 and monetary "rewards" for detailed
reporting. However, section 999 contains more subtle, and more power-
ful, weapons to combat the Arab boycott. The sophisticated reporting
system and pre-existing criminal and civil statutes combine with section
999's definition of boycott participation to produce a statutory scheme
that may substantially reduce compliance with Arab boycott demands.
Il
BOYCOTT COMPLIANCE AND ANTITRUST LAW
Official rumblings that participation in the Arab secondary boycott
might be a violation of United States antitrust laws begun in early
1975.3 Later that year, the Department of Justice announced that an
agreement to boycott Israel as a condition of doing business with a
boycotting country might constitute a Sherman Act violation, and that
peripheral boycott compliance was "[e]ven more suspect."" This sec-
tion will examine the theories under which relevant boycott practices"
note 10, at 1095 (para. N-1). The amount disqualified under § 999 may be deducted, id.
(para. N-2), although taxes paid above the overall limitation may not. Mary A. Marsman,
18 T.C. 1 (1952), rev'd on other grounds, 205 F.2d 335 (4th Cir.), rehearing denied per
curiam, 205 F.2d 335 (1953). See also I.R.C. § 275(a)(4). Thus a taxpayer paying foreign
taxes above the overall limitation receives an "extra" deduction if he participates in an
international boycott. Such a reward for boycott participation was unintended by the
drafters: "The benefits of the foreign tax credit are denied to the taxpayer by reducing
the otherwise allowable foreign tax credit to which the taxpayer would be entitled... after
applying the limitation ... of section 904." H.R. REP. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 466
(1976) (emphasis added).
62. Willful noncompliance is punishable by a $25,000 fine, one year in jail, or both.
I.R.C. § 999(0.
63. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1975, at 50, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1975, at 44, col.
2. See also Letter from Edward H. Levi to Harrison A. Williams, Jr. (Mar. 20, 1975),
reprinted in Foreign Investment Act of 1975: Hearings on S. 425 Before the Subcomm. on
Securities of the House Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 68 (1975). See generally Baker, supra note 3; Note, supra note 32; Note, supra note
6; BoYcorr REPORT, supra note 3, at 49-55.
64. Foreign Investment and Arab Boycott Legislation: Hearings on S. 425, S. 953, S.
955, and S. 1303 Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Finance of the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 165-67 (1975) (statement of Antonin
Scalia, Assistant Attorney General).
65. In economic terms, a primary boycott occurs when one group refuses to deal with
another group. The victims of a primary boycott must be a group who would otherwise
be natural trading partners, not competitors. A secondary boycott occurs when one group
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are held to be antitrust violations, and examine the similarity between
the elements of proof required to establish antitrust violations and the
particulars of the reporting requirements under section 999.
A. APPLICABILITY OF THE SHERMAN AcT
Section 1 of the Sherman Act66 reaches foreign activities having effects
within the United States,67 despite the fact that the contract, combina-
tion, or conspiracy is formed in a foreign country,8 as long as the parties
affect or intend to affect United States trade. 9 The extraterritorial
power of the Sherman Act is sufficient to encompass all international
secondary boycott activity involving American citizens."
Although a unilateral refusal to deal, without more, is not an antitrust
violation since there is no combination," a group boycott, or concerted
refusal to deal, is generally recognized as a per se antitrust violation.72
In a leading boycott case, Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,7
the defendant induced manufacturers and distributors to boycott a sin-
threatens a second group with economic sanctions to force them to boycott a third group,
usually competitors or rivals of the first group. This involves coercing neutrals to choose
between those engaged in the boycott and the victim. An intermediate situation exists
where a group forms a trade association and restricts access by competitors. Bird,
Sherman Act Limitations on Noncommercial Concerted Refusals to Deal, 1970 DUKE L.J.
247, 252-53. See generally Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103
U. PA. L. Rzv. 847 (1955). For a discussion of the equivalent Arab boycott practices, see
note 3 supra.
66. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). Section 1 of the Sherman Act outlaws any "contract, combina-
tion . . . , or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations." Id.
67. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962); United
States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
68. Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66, 88 (1917).
69. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945); see
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951). The Alcoa case has been
broadly endorsed by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100,
106-07 (1948); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811-14 (1946).
70. Essentially, the Sherman Act reaches a restraint if it occurs in the course of foreign
commerce or if it substantially affects either foreign or interstate commerce. Rahl, Foreign
Commerce Jurisdiction of the American Antitrust Laws, 43 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 521,
523 (1974).
71. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); United States v. Colgate
& Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). The Colgate doctrine is tightly circumscribed. Fulda,
Individual Refusals to Deal: When Does Single-Firm Conduct Become Vertical
Restraint?, 30 L. & Cormu'. PRos. 590 (1965).
72. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Originators'
Guild, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Eastern States Retail Lumber
Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
73. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
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gle retail outlet. The Court, rejecting the defendant's argument that a
boycott of one small firm produced no public injury, stated: "Group
boycotts, or concerted refusals by traders to deal with other traders have
long been held to be in the forbidden category. They have not been saved
by allegations that they were reasonable in the specific circumstances
... "" Neither coercion nor economic desirability is a recognized anti-
trust defense. 75 Acquiescence in an illegal conspiracy is as reprehensible
as the creation of one.7" Even if the acquiescence is coerced, resulting in
an "involuntary" restraint of trade, the result is the same." Thus the
fact that an American firm must choose between dealing exclusively
with the Arabs or the Israelis is irrelevant to the governing antitrust
principles.
One apparent but specious difference between an ordinary commer-
cial boycott and the Arab boycott of Israel is that the latter involves a
political purpose,8 which might mitigate antitrust liability." An Ameri-
can firm or person participating in the Arab boycott does so for one
74. Id. at 212 (footnote omitted). The per se rule is applied in commercial group boycott
cases; no inquiry is made into the reasonableness of the conspirators' actions. Bird, supra
note 65, at 275-77.
75. The Supreme Court disapproved the economic "desirability" argument in a similar
situation:
We ... reject the suggestion that the Sherman Act should not be enforced...
because what appellant has done is reasonable in view of current foreign trade
conditions. This position ignores the fact that the provisions in the Sherman Act
against restraints of foreign trade are based on the assumption, and reflect the
policy, that export and import trade in commodities is both possible and desira-
ble. Those provisions of the Act are wholly inconsistent with [the] argument that
American business must be left free to participate in international cartels, that
free foreign commerce in goods must be sacrified in order to foster export of
American dollars .... Acceptance of [this] view would make the Sherman Act
a dead letter insofar as it prohibits contracts and conspiracies in restraint of
foreign trade. If such a drastic change is to be made in the statute, Congress is
the one to do it.
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 599 (1951).
76. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 161 (1948).
77. Id.
78. Boycotts ancillary to a political purpose have not fared well in the courts. In
Brateher v. Akron Area Bd. of Realtors, 381 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1967), the defendant
realtors' association conspired to prevent Blacks from renting or purchasing property in
"white" neighborhoods. The district court found these facts to state a cause of action
under the Sherman Act. In I.P.C. Distrib., Inc. v. Chicago Moving Picture Mach. Opera-
tors Local 110, 132 F. Supp. 294 (N.D. Ill. 1955), a motion picture distributor brought an
antitrust action against the defendant union whose members collectively refused to show
a picture on the ground that it was offensive to the working class. The court held the action
cognizable under § 1 of the Sherman Act.
79. Coons, Non-Commercial Purpose as a Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 705
(1962); Bird, supra note 65, at 261-75.
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reason-profit; therefore, the United States businessman is involved in
a garden variety commercial boycott."0 The American firm should not
be benefited by a co-conspirator's divergent motive."'
B. AGREEMENTS UNDER SECTION 999 AND THE SHERMAN ACT
The most difficult element of proof of a section 1 Sherman Act viola-
tion is the contract, combination, or conspiracy" 2-two or more parties
acting in concert. If the conspiracy is manifest in a written agreement,
there is no difficulty in establishing this element through discovery. If
the agreement is oral or tacit, proof becomes more difficult.M A section
999 return will, in many cases, contain this elusive element since boycott
participants must report boycott agreements whether oral, tacit, or es-
tablished by a course of dealing. 4
American firms engaged in boycott activities may be involved in at
least two different types of conspiracies." An examination of each re-
veals the utility of the section 999 returns for recording the conspira-
torial agreement. The most obvious conspiracy is a boycott agreement
between an American firm and its Arab trading partner. In this situa-
tion, the American firm 'has joined a foreign conspiracy restraining
United States trade.88 The recent litigation in United States v. Bechtel
Corp."7 is illustrative of this type of conspiracy. In Bechtel, the United
States charged that the defendant, a major international prime contrac-
tor, had violated section 1 of the Sherman Act by agreeing to "refuse to
deal with Blacklisted Persons as Subcontractor . . . and ... require
Subcontractors to refuse to deal with Blacklisted Persons .... "m The
case was recently settled in the government's favor; the defendants
agreed to a consent accord, promising not to boycott firms dealing with
80. Coons, supra note 79, at 712, 726-29; Bird, supra note 65, at 249.
81. See Note, supra note 32, at 801.
82. By comparison, the jurisdictional requirement that the restraint be in foreign or
interstate domestic commerce is easily met.
83. "The task of a government prosecutor would be comparatively simple if every case
involved a written agreement. . . ." G. THOMPSON & G. BRADY, ANTITRUST FUNDAMENTALS
57 (1964).
84. See note 26 supra and accompanying text. The Sherman Act recognizes conspiracies
founded in tacit agreements, United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 142-
43 (1966), as well as those established by a course of dealing. American Tobacco Co. v.
United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809-10 (1946); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306
U.S. 208, 226 (1939).
85. See Baker, supra note 3, at 940-42.
86. Id. at 940.
87. Civ. No. 76-99 (N.D. Cal., filed Jan. 16, 1976).
88. Complaint at para. 21(a)-(b), United States v. Bechtel Corp., Civ. No. 76-99 (N.D.
Cal., filed Jan. 16, 1976).
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Israel." Section 999 reports will show precisely whether a Bechtel-type
agreement has been made."0
The second boycott antitrust conspiracy occurs when a national of a
boycotting country forces a group of American firms to agree with each
other to boycott blacklisted firms or individuals as a prerequisite to their
doing business.' Such a conspiracy arose when the Kuwait Interna-
tional Investment Company demanded the exclusion of Lazard Freres
& Co. from various financing syndicates because of the religious make-
up of its management. 2 This situation, a clear domestic antitrust viola-
tion, must also be reported and described under section 999.11
C. SECTION 999 AND SHERMAN AcT DEFENSES
Although a prima facie antitrust case may be established, certain
defenses may preclude successful prosecution. Section 999 anticipates
these problems by exempting those groups who are unlikely antitrust
defendants.94 American companies doing business in an Arab country
must comply with the laws and regulations of the sovereign. In the
current boycott context this means respecting the trade barrier between
Arab nations and Israel. No doubt any sovereign may establish, however
irrationally, its own import and export laws. An American firm respect-
ing this sovereign right should not, and does not, run afoul of American
antitrust law, as long as the command and the obedience to the com-
mand are territorially coextensive with the sovereign's power."
In Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc.," the
court recognized a narrow sovereign compulsion antitrust defense for
international boycott activity. There the Venezuelan government or-
dered defendants, United States oil companies with Venezuelan conces-
89. 42 Fed. Reg. 3716, 3716-24 (1977) (text of stipulation, proposed final judgment and
competitive impact statement).
90. See notes 34-36 supra and accompanying text. Because of the loopholes in I.R.C. §
999(b)(3)(A)(ii), see notes 37-38 supra and accompanying text, not all boycott demand
compliance will be reported; any participation reported under that subsection is, however,
an antitrust violation.
91. Baker, supra note 3, at 941.
92. Letter from Harrison A. Williams, Jr. and Jacob K. Javits to Edward I. Levi and
Ray Garrett, Jr. (Feb. 28, 1975), reprinted in Foreign Investment Act of 1975: Hearings
on S. 425 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the House Comm. on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1975). This particular boycott attempt proved
unsuccessful.
93. See notes 34 & 39 supra and accompanying text.
94. For example, the § 999 requirement that agreements be as a condition of doing
business or as a condition of sale eliminates all agreements not in restraint of trade.
95. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943); Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Repub-
lic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
96. 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
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sions, to boycott plaintiff, a United States refiner. The court found that:
Commerce may exist at the will of the government, and to impose liabil-
ity for obedience to that will would eliminate for many companies the
ability to transact business in foreign lands. Were compulsion not a
defense, American firms abroad faced with a government order would
have to choose one country or the other in which to do business. The
Sherman Act does not go so far.!
The anti-competitive acts must be the result of the sovereign effec-
tively exerting its compulsion within its territorial boundaries or there
is no defense;9" in Interamerican the agreement, the restraint, and the
defendants were all within Venezuela. Conversely, where the acts in
restraint of trade occur without the territorial limits of the sovereign, or
where the acts are actually those of private parties utilizing the foreign
law as an artifice, antitrust liability will attach." Thus, legitimate sov-
ereign compulsion does not exist where private conspirators act in con-
formity with a foreign law and effect a restraint on United States foreign
commerce,' or where they are aided by discriminatory legislation,"' or
where the private party chooses to deal with a sovereign outside of his
territorial boundaries where the command has no force. Section 999
reflects the sovereign compulsion defense and its territorial limitations
and exempts a boycott agreement such as that involved in
Interamerican.'0
I
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
A. APPLICABILITY OF TITLE VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' o1 prohibits discriminatory
employment practices in the private sector.' 4 Section 999 requires the
97. Id. at 1298 (emphasis added)(footnote omitted).
98. Id. at 1298 nn.18 & 19.
99. See generally Fugate, Antitrust Jurisdiction and Foreign Sovereignty, 49 VA. L.
REV. 925 (1963).
100. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
101. United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
102. I.R.C. § 999(b)(4). The Interamerican boycott would be exempted by I.R.C. §
999(b)(4)(C).
103. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
104. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to... terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's ... religion . . . or national origin; or (2) to limit,
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
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reporting of all agreements to remove or refrain from selecting corporate
directors or to refrain from employing individuals of a particular nation-
ality, race, or religion.' 5 Many, if not all, discriminatory agreements
reported under section 999 are clear Title VII violations.'8
An employer may discriminate on the basis of religion or national
origin where these traits are "bona fide occupational qualification[s]
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business
or enterprise."'' 7 It is unlikely that religion or national origin is a bona
fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) for an employee hired for work
inside any Arab country even though members of some religious sects
are currently unable to obtain entry visas.
Although there is no federal' 8 case directly in point, certain principles
may be derived from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) regulations. The EEOC guidelines on religious discrimination"'
do not refer to BFOQ's, probably because few legitimate religious quali-
fications exist. With regard to sex-based discrimination the guidelines
provide that "[t]he refusal to hire an individual because of the prefer-
ences of ... clients or customers""' is not a situation warranting the
which would.., tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
... religion... or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
105. I.R.C. § 999(b)(3)(A)(iii)-(iv). See notes 39-45 supra and accompanying text.
106. Two issues arise in this context. Section 999 requires reports on a foreign subsidi-
ary's discriminatory agreements, see note 20 supra, but is is not clear whether Title VII
has similar extraterritorial application. Title VII probably applies to discrimination
against United States citizens overseas, but not to aliens. Note, Civil Rights in Employ-
ment and the Multinational Corporations, 10 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 87 (1976); Foreign Invest-
ment and Arab Boycott Legislation: Hearings on S. 425, S. 953, S. 995, and S. 1303 Before
the Subcomm. on Int'l Finance of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 165 (1975) (statement of Antonin Scalia, Assistant Attorney
General). Therefore, only United States resident taxpayers' § 999 returns can safely be
assumed to reveal Title VII violations.
The second issue is whether Title VII applies to discrimination against corporate direc-
tors. Directors are elected and removed, but Title VII speaks only of hiring and discharging
individuals. See note 104 supra. Further, the statute covers employment, id., and a direc-
tor acts as a fiduciary. H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF CORPOPRsTONs 415 (2d ad. 1970).
See Foust v. Transamerica Corp., 391 F. Supp. 312, 315 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
108. For a state court case involving similar facts, see American Jewish Congress v.
Carter, 23 Misc. 2d 446, 190 N.Y.S.2d 218 (Sup. Ct. 1959), modified, 10 App. Div. 2d 833,
199 N.Y.S.2d 157 (1st Dep't 1960), aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d 223, 173 N.E.2d 788, 213 N.Y.S.2d 60
(1961). For a discussion of this boycott discrimination litigation see Note, Complicity with
Arab Blacklist: Business Expendience Versus Abridgment of Constitutional Rights, 2
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 228, 229-35 (1976).
109. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1975).
110. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(iii) (1975).
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application of the BFOQ exception."' Further, a BFOQ must be
"reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular busi-
ness" 2 which entails the application of the "business necessity" test."'
This test, however, concerns only the ability of the prospective employee
to perform the job with the requisite degree of safety and efficiency,",
and in the boycott context, religion has no relation'to either job safety
or efficiency."'
B. SECTION 999 ExCEPTMONS
Under section 999, employers are permitted to make employment
contingent upon the worker obtaining an entry visa for an Arab country
without having participated in an international boycott."' Furthermore,
the employer has arguably not run afoul of Title VII since he has offered
equal terms of employment to all. This exception resembles the stipula-
tion entered in a state employment discrimination case involving simi-
lar facts."' The stipulation provided: "[I]n connection with applicants
hired for work in Saudi Arabia . ..[the employer] may advise such
applicants that their employment is contingent upon such applicants'
ability to obtain a visa from the Saudi Arabian government .... " 8 The
validity of contingent contracts of employment under Title VII has not
been decided. The scheme, although neutral on its face, results in a
discriminatory effect and might be unlawful. On the other hand, under
the contingent or conditional contract, the Arab government discrimi-
nates by refusing visas to certain parties in a legitimate exercise of
sovereign power; the American party, having offered equal terms to all,
should be insulated from Title VII liability. Any other solution would
end United States economic presence within the Arab League or force
111. Accord, Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1970).
113. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 950 (1971).
114. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S.
1006 (1971); Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870, 879 (6th Cir. 1973).
115. A legitimate BFOQ must also be job-related, and religion, per se, does not relate
to job performance. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
116. Guidelines I, supra note 10, at 49,928-29 (paras. H-9 to H-15). See note 28 supra.
117. American Jewish Congress v. Carter, 23 Misc. 2d 446, 190 N.Y.S.2d 218 (Sup. Ct.
1959), modified, 10 App. Div. 2d 833, 199 N.Y.S.2d 157 (1st Dep't 1969), aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d
223, 173 N.E.2d 788, 213 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1961). For a short history of the litigation leading
up to the settlement stipulation, see N.Y. State Comm'n Human Rights L. Bull. issue
195, at 8-10 (Mar. 1, 1963) (In 1968, the Commission's name was changed to the State
Division for Human Rights).
118. N.Y. State Comm'n Human Rights L. Bull., issue 195, at 10 (Mar. 1, 1963).
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domestic concerns to hire overseas beyond the reach of Title VII."9
In sum, agreements to discriminate made by American corporations
hiring domestically and reported under section 999 are similar to Title
VII violations. As is also true of antitrust violations, the section 999
returns will reveal the nature of the discrimination and will contain a
description of the particular operation in which it occurred.
IV
DISCOVERY OF SECTION 999 RETURNS
Information returns containing incriminating evidence have little de-
terrent value unless a party with an interest in instituting a suit can
obtain the return. Thus the procedures available for the disclosure of tax
returns are crucial to an assessment of the impact that section 999 will
have on boycott operations.' 0
Federal tax returns 2' are generally deemed to be confidential commu-
nications between a taxpayer and the United States Government., The
119. See note 106 supra.
120. Under authority of the EAA, the Department of Commerce requires exporters and
related service organizations to report all boycott related requests. 41 Fed. Reg. 46,443-45
(1976) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369.4). The new EAA reporting forms, 41 Fed. Reg.
46,446-47 (1976), require the taxpayer to state whether or not he complied with the re-
quest. 41 Fed. Reg. 46,445 (1976) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369.4(b)(2), (c)(2)).
Further, all reports filed under the EAA are open to public inspection. 41 Fed. Reg. 46,445
(1976) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 369.4(a)). See also note 6 supra. The publicly disclosed
reports filed under the EAA have an antiboycott potential similar to § 999 returns which
are not in the public domain. See Note, supra note 6, at 98. The EAA reports, however,
differ from § 999 returns in several important aspects; only exporters and related service
organizations must report; boycott transactions carried out through foreign brokers or
subsidiaries are not covered. The Department of Commerce's enforcement record is very
weak; it hands out few sanctions for noncompliance. Because of the inherent conflict
between its duties as the EAA administrator and its duties as a promoter of export trade,
stringent enforcement in the future is unlikely. See note 6 supra. Should a federal agency
charged with the enforcement of antitrust or civil rights statutes attempt to use these
reports as an investigative or prosecutorial tool, compliance with the EAA reporting re-
quirements might diminish. In contrast, § 999 has an inherent enforcement mechanism
precluding wholesale noncompliance-multiple returns describing the same boycott par-
ticipation filed by persons not personally involved in that operation and having no interest
in noncompliance. See notes 15, 20 & 54 supra and accompanying text. Also, being a tax
statute, § 999 will be enforced by the Department of the Treasury which has no direct
stake in export trade volume. Audits, fines, and prison sentences for willful noncompliance
complete the rigorous enforcement scheme. I.R.C. §§ 999(f), 6672, 7201, 7206-07. See note
57 supra. Further, § 999 returns have an element of prosecutorial convenience; because
the definition of boycott participation is narrowly drawn, admissions of certain classes of
participation are bound to be violations of some other law. See notes 82-119 supra and
accompanying text.
121. The term "return" includes § 999 information returns. I.R.C. § 6103(b)(1).
122. I.R.C. § 6103(a).
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privileged status given tax returns is based on the theory that a volun-
tary taxation system is better served if the taxpayer can be reasonably
certain that his disclosures are made in confidence.1n Often, the govern-
ment's need for information conflicts with this theory and a balance is
struck through limited disclosure.2l Assuming that some section 999
returns "may constitute evidence of a violation of [antitrust] laws,"''
the Secretary of the Treasury may, on his own initiative, disclose to the
Department of Justice data indicating the fact, frequency, and total
number of such violations.121 Most importantly, the Secretary may also
disclose the identity of a boycott participant and the exact nature of the
participation whenever this information has been reported to the IRS
by another person.'2 Under this scheme, the Department of Justice will
be able to sensibly allocate antitrust enforcement resources; the Depart-
ment will also know the identity of at least some boycott antitrust
violators.12r
Any section 999 return may be disclosed to the Department of Justice
for antitrust law enforcement upon application for a court order.2 9 Al-
though the statute does not explicitly state that the application must
include the identity of the taxpayer, it does require that there be, in
123. Heathman v. United States Dist. Court, 503 F.2d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 1974).
124. I.R.C. § 6103. The Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1202(a), 90 Stat.
1667, radically changed I.R.C. § 6103. The prior formulation, allowing a much higher
degree of disclosure, would have been more advantageous from a prosecutorial standpoint.
To realize the full potential of § 999 returns, Congress should place them in the public
domain. For a discussion of the changes in I.R.C. § 6103 wrought by the Tax Reform Act
of 1976, see H.R. REP. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 475-83 (1976).
125. I.R.C. § 6103(i)(3). See notes 63-102 supra and accompanying text.
126. I.R.C. § 6103(b), (i)(3). In addition, the President or Congress could demand that
the Secretary take such action.
127. Id. Section 999 requires persons to report participation or cooperation by others
with whom they are affiliated by business form or stock ownership. See notes 15, 20 & 54
supra and accompanying text. For example, if one partner reports another partner's par-
ticipation, the Secretary may, on his own initiative, transmit that information along with
the participator's identity to the Department of Justice. There can be similar disclosure
of some of the participation of members of controlled groups (other members reporting)
and of DISCs (shareholders reporting). This important result was not an unintentional
consequence of the I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2)-(3) definitions: "[I.R.C. § 6103(i)] authorizes the
IRS ... to disclose in writing to the Justice Department... information relating to the
possible violation of a Federal criminal law which is received from sources other than the
taxpayer. ... " H.R. REP. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 478 (1976) (emphasis added).
128. The § 999 return information received under this scheme will not be the equivalent
of an admission against interest as the information will be received from a source other
than the participant. See note 127 supra. Nonetheless, the information will constitute the
"reasonable cause" necessary to obtain by court order the boycott participant's own
return, which will be an admission. See note 130 infra and accompanying text.
129. I.R.C. § 6103(i)(1).
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addition to some necessity, "reasonable cause to believe ...that a
specific criminal act has been committed.""'3 A "specific criminal act"
implies a specific criminal actor, so this disclosure method is probably
limited to the returns of identified taxpayers. Even this limited access
to individual returns through court order will be of immense value to
the Department of Justice. Where a possible boycott-related antitrust
offense is discovered through independent means, 3' the related return
will show whether or not an offense was committed, and could establish
all the elements of a prima facie case.
Private parties aggrieved by boycott-related antitrust violations can-
not utilize the alleged offender's section 999 returns for an investigatory
purpose,' but once an action is commenced, returns may be subject to
discovery in appropriate circumstances. Although the statutory confi-
dentiality accorded federal tax returns only restricts dissemination by
government officials, some courts have read into the statutory scheme
an implied, limited protection against discovery by private parties, find-
ing a public policy against disclosure.' Nonetheless, the majority rule
requires a litigant to produce his returns upon a discovery demand
where the return bears on a central issue in the case.' If the litigant
has not retained a copy, he must obtain a copy of his return from the
government. ' Under the majority formulation, section 999 returns are
discoverable and admissible because they contain admissions against
interest bearing on a central issue in dispute.
130. I.R.C. § 6103(i)(1)(B)(i). "[M]uch less than probable cause will suffice" to meet
a reasonable cause requirement. United States v. King, 517 F.2d 350, 352 (5th Cir. 1975).
Reasonable cause is essentially suspicion. See id. It may also mean a "reasonable possibil-
ity." McLeod v. Local 25, IBEW, 344 F.2d 634, 638 (2d Cir. 1965), citing McLeod v.
Business Mach. & Office Appliance Mechanics Local 459, 300 F.2d 237, 241 (2d Cir. 1962).
See also H.R. REP. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 482 (1976) (reasonable cause require-
ment to be construed according to plain language).
131. See notes 120 & 128 supra and accompanying text.
132. I.R.C. § 6103(e)(1)(A)(i).
133. See Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Kreuger, 55 F.R.D. 512, 514-15 (N.D. Ill.
1972) and cases cited therein. But see Heathman v. United States Dist. Court, 503 F.2d
1032 (9th Cir. 1974) (allowing unlimited discovery of federal tax returns by private liti-
gants).
134. See Konczakowski v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 19 F.R.D. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) and
cases cited therein; Karlsson v. Wolfson, 18 F.R.D. 474, 476 (D. Minn. 1956). Contra,
Austin v. Aluminum Co. of America, 15 F.R.D. 490 (E.D. Tenn. 1954). Konczakowski and
Karsson were decided under the prior formulation of I.R.C. § 6103. Although the Tax
Reform Act of 1976 substantially changed the language of § 6103, the rule in
Konczakowski should remain undisturbed because the current section, like its prior for-
mulation, restricts only dissemination of tax returns by government officials.
135. Kingsley v. Delaware Lack. & W.R.R., 20 F.R.D. 156, 158-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1957);
Karlsson v. Wolfson, 18 F.R.D. 474, 476 (D. Minn. 1956). I.R.C. § 6103(e)(1), (5) permits
a litigant to obtain his own return.
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Although the EEOC may not obtain federal income tax returns di-
rectly from the IRS,'38 the EEOC does have unrestricted access to all
documentary evidence, including retained copies of tax returns, of any
person or firm being investigated.'37 Since most persons realize when
they have been victimized by discriminatory employment practices, the
victim can identify the discriminating employer when the complaint is
filed, which will provide the EEOC with the initial discovery of the
offense. The copies of the section 999 returns obtained by the EEOC will
establish, by admission, the type of discriminatory employment prac-
tice condemned by Title VII.
The potential of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 to reduce domestic com-
pliance with the Arab boycott depends on both the effort expended by
the appropriate government agencies and the willingness of private liti-
gants to press their claims. Instead of a direct prohibition, section 999
facilitates a flexible enforcement-oriented approach causing boycott
activity to vary with the allocation of enforcement resources. Should
Congress or the Executive find that cessation of boycott activities out-
weighs any concomitant negative impact on foreign trade and foreign
policy, each may direct and implement more strict enforcement of the
antitrust and civil rights laws. The process may be reversed, if and when
the need should arise.
V
FIFTH AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS
Where the law requires reports disclosing criminal violations to gov-
ernment officials, issues concerning the applicability of the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination'38 are bound to arise. This sec-
tion will examine the circumstances under which the privilege may be
invoked and the procedure for asserting this right.
The fifth amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination
is not available to corporations "' or to any collective entity in which the
members operate in a representative capacity.14 Nor may a member of
136. I.R.C. § 6103(i)(1)-(4) only relates to criminal statutes; Title VII creates only civil
remedies.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
138. "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself. .. ." U.S. CONST. amend. V. In any case, the fifth amendment will only apply
to reports of boycott participation which constitute Sherman Act violations.
139. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S.
361, 382 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74 (1906).
140. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 passim (1974); United States v. White, 322
U.S. 694, 699 (1944).
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such an entity invoke the privilege with respect to the entity's records,
even though he might be personally incriminated by their production.''
Clearly, the fifth amendment enables no United States corporation or
collective entity engaged in international boycott operations to refuse to
comply with section 999 on grounds of self-incrimination.
The individual businessman, broker, trader, or sole proprietor stands
on a very different footing. Because the admissions of a taxpayer's own
illegal activity present real hazards of incrimination' and constitute
"link[s] in the chain" of evidence' necessary to convict, an individual
may invoke the fifth amendment privilege.'
"The information revealed in the preparation and filing of an income
tax return is, for purposes of Fifth Amendment analysis, the testimony
of a 'witness,' as that term is used. . ." in the amendment.' Regarding
standard income tax returns, it is settled that the fifth amendment may
not be used as a defense for failure to file a return."' In United States
v. Sullivan"4 7 the taxpayer claimed that the fifth amendment justified
his willful failure to file a standard return, which asked a taxpayer's
occupation, because he had earned his income through illegal activities.
The Court, recognizing that illegal income is normally subject to taxa-
141. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 88 (1974); Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S.
118, 122 (1957). The privilege extends only to private papers and records held in a purely
personal capacity because the privilege itself is inherently personal. United States v.
White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944); see Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327-28 (1973).
142. See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374-75 (1951).
143. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); Blau v. United States, 340
U.S. 159, 161 (1950).
144. The "required records" exception to the fifth amendment privilege should not
apply. Under this doctrine records required by statute or regulation to be made, preserved,
and produced are not private and therefore are not accorded fifth amendment privilege.
In Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948), the Court found that where records are
required to be preserved for examination as an aid for enforcement of a statutory program,
they are public documents not subject to fifth amendment privileges. However, in Shapiro
the "required records" were an essential part of a particular legislative program. Even
though the IRS requires that all tax-related records be kept and that returns be filed,
I.R.C. §§ 6001, 6011(a), the absence of an explicit coordinate nontax legislative program
in § 999 necessitating records for its enforcement should preclude application of the
Shapiro doctrine. See generally Note, The Fifth Amendment and the Production of Re-
cords: Are Ownership and Possession Always Necessary?, 9 GA. L. REv. 658, 659-63 (1975);
Note, Required Information and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 65 COLUM. L.
REV. 681 (1965). In any case, rigorous application of the required records exception would
substantially weaken the privilege against self-incrimination, allowing Congress to decide
when and where the privilege could be asserted. For this reason it is not often pressed.
See Stuart v. United States, 416 F.2d 459, 462 n.2 (5th Cir. 1969).
145. Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 656 (1976).
146. Id.; United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 262 (1927).
147. 274 U.S. 259 (1927).
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tion, remarked: "If the form of the return provided called for answers
that the defendant was privileged from making he could have raised the
objection in the return, but could not on that account refuse to make
any return at all .. ."I's In Garner v. United States,"' which involved
a non-tax criminal prosecution, the Court held that if a taxpayer fails
to assert a valid privilege on the return itself, it is lost.
In contrast to the general rule, there have been several reporting situa-
tions where any reply, including an assertion of the privilege, would
have been incriminating; in such cases the individual was allowed to
assert the privilege by filing no return."'0 Should section 999 returns fall
into this category, an individual could lawfully refuse to file. 5 ' In each
of the cases where failure to file was approved, the government had
sought answers to questions not "neutral on their face and directed at
the public at large,"' 52 but aimed at individual members of "a highly
selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities."5 The statu-
tory schemes involved in these cases assured disclosure of any reply to
state or federal prosecutors. The constitutional deficiencies of some of
the foregoing statutory schemes were eliminated by amendments pro-
hibiting disclosure of reported information."'
148. Id., at 263.
149. 424 U.S. 648 (1976).
150. See, e.g., Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) (gambling registration
statute); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968)(gambling excise tax); Albertson v.
Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965) (registration of Communists). Both
Marchetti and Grosso involved coordinate statutes that required gamblers to maintain
books and records on gambling activities and also provided that lists of registered gam-
blers be maintained for public inspection. Marchetti overruled United States v. Kahriger,
345 U.S. 22 (1953) and Lewis v. United States, 348 U.S. 419 (1955).
151. A total failure to file might be an excessively liberal safeguard and a third method
might be devised.
152. Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965).
153. Id.
154. Act of October 29, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-499, § 3(c)-(d), 88 Stat. 1551. See H.R.
REP. No. 1401, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 6232, 6233. It is questionable whether merely repealing the mandatory disclosure
statutes effected the same result. See Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 203,
82 Stat. 1235 (repealing I.R.C. § 6107) (relating to disclosure of the identity of persons
paying the gambling occupational tax); S. REp. No. 1501, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1968).
A parallel situation was presented in Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968). There
the Court invalidated on fifth amendment grounds a statutory scheme requiring registra-
tion of firearms commonly used in criminal activities. Related statutes made the registra-
tion information available to prosecutors. Amendments to the statutes that effected abso-
lute nondisclosure of the information rehabilitated the statutory scheme. The Court tested
these amendments in United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971), and concluded: "[Tihe
claimant is not confronted by 'substantial and "real"' but merely 'trifling or imaginary
hazards of incrimination' ... by reason of the unavailability of the registration data...
to local, state, and other federal agencies . . . ." Id. at 606.
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Section 999 returns likewise require answers to questions not "neutral
on their face." An assertion of the privilege in response to a question
asking, in effect, whether the taxpayer committed any boycott-related
antitrust violations tells the investigator that the taxpayer has in fact
committed the crime. However, under the provisions limiting disclosure
of tax returns,'55 the investigator must be reasonably sure of that fact
in order to obtain the return and he will find little additional evidence
where the taxpayer has asserted his privilege in response to particular
questions. This protection relieves the taxpayer of any substantial haz-
ard of further incrimination, rendering a failure to file an unlikely
method of asserting the fifth amendment privilege. 5
CONCLUSION
Arab countries conducting a trade boycott against Israel and its sup-
porters require American firms to join the boycott as a condition of doing
business. Section 999 of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 contains potentially
powerful antiboycott provisions that deny certain tax benefits to boycott
participators, and inform Congress of the scope of United States in-
volvement in the boycott. Moreover, the reports required under this
section in conjunction with federal antitrust and civil rights laws should
substantially reduce boycott participation because of their availability
to prospective governmental and private litigants. The provisions pro-
vide a flexible antiboycott weapon, as their efficacy depends on the
willingness of law enforcement officials to pursue the Arab boycott issue.
Finally, the self-reporting aspects of the provisions present minimal
fifth amendment self-incrimination problems.
Charles H. Wagner
As this Note went to press, President Carter signed the Export Ad-
ministration Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52 (1977). These
amendments substantially strengthen the EAA and empower the Presi-
dent to issue rules and regulations prohibiting compliance with certain
boycott demands. The regulations promulgated under the Amendments
should be considered with respect to any transaction involving Ameri-
can compliance with foreign boycotts.
155. For a discussion of the limited disclosure provisions, see notes 125-37 supra and
accompanying text.
156. See note 154 supra.
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